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CISG ARTICLE 31: WHEN SUBSTANTIVE LAW RULES AFFECT
JURISDICTIONAL RESULTS
Ronald A. Brand

I. INTRODUCTION

Judicial application of Article 31 of the U.N. Sales Convention has
proved that the determination of the place of performance of the seller's
obligation can have implications beyond just the substantive effect of that
obligation. In fact, many of the cases dealing with this article apply its
substantive rules primarily for purposes of determiningjurisdictional outcome.
This raises important questions of uniformity in the application of the
Convention.
CISG Article 31 provides four rather specific rules for determining the
place of performance of the seller's delivery obligation, each depending on
party choices and the type of contract relationship involved. These rules are
important for both contract formation and dispute resolution purposes. The
fact that parties may structure a transaction to avoid the three default rules of
Article 31 makes important a clear understanding of the import and effect of
these rules.
In this paper I first provide a brief review of the substantive rules found
in CISG Article 31. I then discuss the cases under the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions that rely on Article 31 to help determine the existence of
jurisdiction in a court other than a court in the state of the defendant's
domicile. This is compared with the approach to jurisdiction in the United
States that makes the Article 31 rules less likely to have significance for
jurisdictional purposes. Finally, I discuss a series of hypothetical cases in
order to explore these differences and to consider further aspects of the
relationship between CISG rules of substantive law and rules ofjurisdiction.
I conclude that Article 31 is an example of a CISG provision for which the
"homeward trend" will have different impact in differing legal systems,
particularly in its application to jurisdictional questions.

Professor of Law and Director, Center for International Legal Education, University of
Pittsburgh. GregoryWalker provided excellent research assistance and editorial cornunit in the preparation
of this paper.
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II. THE STRUCTURE AND EFFECT OF ARTICLE 31
CISG Article 31' sets up four rules for determining the place of
performance of the seller's obligation to deliver goods: a party autonomy rule
followed by three default rules. The party autonomy rule is found in the
chapeau to the Article, noting that the default rules of subparagraphs (a), (b),
and (c) apply only "[i]f the seller is not bound to deliver the goods at any other
particular place."2 Thus, if the contract otherwise establishes a place of
performance of the seller's obligation to deliver the goods, no other reference
to the provisions of Article 31 is required. While this appears to be a rather
simple rule, its application is not always clear. For instance, when a contract
includes a price-delivery term (e.g., f.o.b., c.i.f., etc.), that term may or may
not clearly determine the place of performance of the seller's delivery
obligation.3 Rules providing the effect of price-delivery terms are not always
consistent,4 and other provisions of the contract may alter the effect of a price-

1.
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 31, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97/I8, Annex 1 (Apr. 11, 1980) [hereinafter CISG], English version reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg.
6262 (Mar. 2, 1987), and in 19 I.L.M. 671 (1980):
Article 31
If the seller is not bound to deliver the goods at any other particular place, his obligation to deliver
consists:
(a) if the contract of sale involves carriage of the goods-in handing the goods over to the first
carrier for transmission to the buyer;
(b) if, in cases not within the preceding subparagraph, the contract relates to specific goods, or
unidentified goods to be drawn from a specific stock or to be manufactured or produced, and
at the time of the conclusion of the contract the parties knew that the goods were at, or were to
be manufactured or produced at, a particularplace--in placing the goods at the buyer's disposal
at that place;
(c) in other cases-in placing the goods at the buyer's disposal at the place where the seller had his
place of business at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
2.
Id.
3.
For discussion of the effect of price-delivery terms on the application of the CISG, see, for
example, Johan Erauw, Observationson PassingofRisk, in ThE DRAFT UNCITRAL DIGEST AND BEYOND:
CASES, ANALYSISAND UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE U.N. SALES CONVENTION 292 (Franco Ferrari etal. eds.,
2004); Jan Hellner, The Vienna Convention and StandardForm Contracts,in INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS: DUBROVNIK LECTURES 335 (Petar Sarcevic & Paul Volken eds., 1986); Burghard Piltz,
INCOTERMS andthe UN Conventionon Contractsforthe InternationalSale ofGoods, in REVIEW OF THE
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 1998 at I (Pace Int'l Law
Review ed., 1998).
4.
While the parties may incorporate the Incoterms of the International Chamber of Commerce to
govern interpretation of price-delivery terms in a contract, it should not be assumed that all price-delivery
terms are govemed by the Incotems. For example, those terms may be subject to the definitions contained
in the version of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code still in effect in most all U.S. states, which
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delivery term.I Nonetheless, Article 31 begins with a clear acknowledgment
6
of party autonomy in determining the rules applicable to a private contract.
Article 31 then goes on to provide three default rules that may be
applicable if the parties did not agree on a place for performance of the
seller's delivery obligation. Which of these three rules applies depends on the
type of contract involved. If the contract "involves carriage of the goods,"
then paragraph (a) provides that the seller's obligation to deliver consists "in
handing the goods over to the first carrier for transmission to the buyer."7 If
the contract does not involve carriage of goods, and "relates to specific goods,
or unidentified goods to be drawn from a specific stock or to be manufactured
or produced, and at the time of the conclusion of the contract the parties knew
that the goods were at, or were to be manufactured or produced at, a particular
place," then the seller's obligation is to place "the goods at the buyer's
disposal at that place."' In all other cases, the seller's obligation is to place
the goods "at the buyer's disposal at the place where the seller had his place
of business at the time of the conclusion of the contract."9
Article 31 represents a clear attempt to define place of performance in
accordance with the facts of a case. To the extent it is necessary to determine
a place of performance for legal purposes, the result may at times amount to
a legal fiction designed simply to provide that there is a place for purposes of
the application of other legal rules.
III. PLACE OF PERFORMANCE AND JURISDICTION INEUROPE
One of the most commonly-litigated issues under Article 31 has been
whether a given court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a contract action governed
by the CISG based on jurisdictional rules that allow a plaintiff to bring a case

includes definitions not always consistent with those found in the Incoterms. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-319
to -322 (without 2002-03 amendments).
5.
See, e.g., Comptoir D'Achat etde Vente du Boerenbond Beige S/A v. Luis De Ridder, Ltda.
(The Julia), [1949] A.C. 293 (H.L.) (c.i.f. allocation of transfer of risk and of title to goods altered by use
of delivery order rather than bill of lading).
6.
This is at least in part a eiteration ofthe Article 6 CISG rule that "[tihe parties may exclude the
application of this Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its
provisions." CISG art. 6.
7.
CISG art. 31(a).
8.
CISG art. 3 1(b).
9.
CISG art. 3 1(c). For a more complete discussion of the case law applying each of the provisions
of Article 31, see UNCITRAL DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS art. 3 1, at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case-law/digests/cisg.html
(last visited Sept. 25, 2005) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Digest].
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at the place of performance of a contract obligation. This normally involves
the application of Article 5(1) of either the Brussels Convention"0 or the
Lugano Convention."' While the Brussels Convention has been replaced by
the Brussels I Regulation, 2 the cases interpreting it remain instructive.
In each of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, the "general" rule of
jurisdiction is found in Article 2, allowing suit to be brought in the courts of
the state of the defendant's domicile. 3 Other rules then provide for limited,
"special" jurisdictional options allowing suit in a court other than in the state
of the defendant's domicile. Article 5(1) of both the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions provides the special jurisdiction rule for contract cases, and reads
as follows: "A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another
Contracting State, be sued: 1. in matters relating to a contract, in the courts

" Thus, Article
for the place of performance of the obligation in question; ....
5(1) provides the plaintiff an option, and allows a certain amount of forum
shopping.' 4 It is most often used to bring an action in the plaintiff's home
forum.

10. European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1 (consolidated and updated version of the 1968 Convention and
the Protocol of 1971, following the 1996 accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and
the Kingdom of Sweden) [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
11. European Communities-European Free Trade Association: Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9
[hereinafter Lugano Convention].
12. Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 012) 1 [hereinafter Brussels I
Regulation]. The Brussels Convention remains in force for relations between Denmark and the other
Member States.
13. Article 2(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, supra note 12, reads as follows: "1. Subject to this
Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of
that Member State."
14. See, e.g., Case 189/87, Kalfelis v. Bankhaus Schrbdar, Munchmeyer, Hengst & Co., 1988
E.C.R. 5565.
Pursuant to Article 2 of the Convention, persons domiciled in a Contracting State are, subject to the
provisions of the Convention, "whatever their nationality, to be sued in the courts of that State".
Section 2 of Title 11of the Convention, however, provides for "special jurisdictions", by virtue of
which a defendant domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued in another Contracting State....
The principle laid down in the Convention is that jurisdiction is vested in the courts of the State of
the defendant's domicile and that the jurisdiction provided for in [the "special jurisdict ion" articles
are] exception[s] to that principle.
Id. at 5583, In 7-8. "[T]he 'special jurisdictions' enumerated in Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention
constitute derogations from the principle that jurisdiction is vested in the courts of the State where the
defendant is domiciled and as such must be interpreted restrictively." Id. at 5585, 19.

2005-06]

CISG ARTICLE 31

Article 5(1) obviously makes important the determination of the place of
3 the
performance of "the obligation in question." In Tessili v. Dunlop,"
European Court of Justice rejected the argument that place of performance for
purposes of Article 5(1) had its own independent meaning common to all
Member States of the European Community, and opted instead for the rule
that "'place of performance of the obligation in question' within the meaning
of Article 5(1) ...is to be determined in accordance with the law which

governs the obligations in question according to the rules of conflict of laws
of the court before which the matter is brought."' 6
The Sales Convention has two rules dealing with the place of
performance of contractual obligations. In addition to the Article 31
provisions determining the place of performance of the seller's delivery
obligation, Article 57 provides the rule on place of the buyer's obligation to
pay the purchase price. 7 Each of these articles has been applied to determine

15. Case 12/76, Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG, 1976 E.C.R. 1473.
16. Id. at 1485. See also Franco Ferrari, "Forum Shopping" Despite International Uniform
ContractLaw Conventions, 51 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 689, 691-92 (2002):
While the concept of 'matters relating to a contract' is interpreted both by the European Court of
Justice and national courts autonomously, i.e, without recourse to domestic law, the concept of
.place of performance' is not interpreted autonomously, but rather on the basis of the law applicable
to the obligation in dispute, as held by not only the European Court of Justice, but also by national
courts. This can be either the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law of
the forum or substantive uniform law.
This aspect of the Tessili decision has been followed in subsequent cases. See Case C-288/92, Custom
Made Commercial v. Stawa Metallbau, 1994 E.C.R. 1-2913; Case C-440/97, GIE Groupe Concorde v. The
Master of the vessel "Suhadiwamo Panjan," 1999 E.C.R. 1-6307; and Case C-420/97, Leathertex v.
Bodetex, 1999 E.C.R. 1-6747.
17. CISG art. 57:
Article 57
(I) If the buyer is not bound to pay the price at any other particular place, he must pay it to the
seller:
(a) at the seller's place of business; or
(b) if the payment is to be made against the handing over of the goods or of documents, at the
place where the handing over takes place.
(2) The seller must bear any increase in the expenses incidental to payment which is caused by a
change in his place of business subsequent to the conclusion of the contract.
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the existence ofjurisdiction under Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention,"8
and Article 5(1) of the Lugano Convention. 9
18. For cases applying Article 31 to determine jurisdiction for purposes of Article 5(1), see, for
example, the following cases listed in the UNCITRAL Digest: CLOUT Case No. 268 [Bundesgerichtshof,
Germany, I I Dec. 1996], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/96121 lgl.html; Hoge Raad, the
Netherlands, 26 Sept. 1997, available athttp://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970926nl .html; CLOUT Case
No. 207 [Cour de Cassation, France, 2 Dec. 1997], available athttp://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/971202fl
.htmi; CLOUT Case No. 242 [Cour de Cassation, France, 16 July 1998], available at http://cisgw3.law
.pace.edu/cases/980716fl.html; ObersterGerichtshot Austria, 10 Sept. 1998, availableathttp://cisgw3.law
.pace.edu/cases/980910a4.html.
For cases applying Article 57 to determine jurisdiction for purposes of Article 5(1), see, for example,
the following cases listed in the UNCITRAL Digest: Bundesgerichtshof, Germany, 30 Apr. 2003, available
athttp://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/O343Ogl .html; Rechtbank van Koophandel Veume, Belgium, 19 Mar.
2003, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/03031 9b .html; Bundesgerichtshof, Germany, 2 Oct.
2002, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021001gI.html; Hof van Beroep Gent, Belgium,
15 May 2002, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020515bl.html; Hof van Beroep Gent,
Belgium, 31 Jan. 2002, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020131 b1.html; Bundesgerichtshof,
Germany, 7 Nov. 2001, available athttp://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/01 1107gl.html; Cour de Cassation,
France, 26 June 2001, availableat http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/0 10626fl .html; Landgericht Flensburg,
Germany, 19 Jan. 2001, available athttp://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/01 01 19g .html; CLOUT Case No.
379 [Corte di Cassazione S.U., Italy, 14 Dec. 1999], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
991214i3.html; CLOUTCaseNo. 343 [LandgerichtDarmstadt, Germany, 9 May2000], available athttp://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000509gl.html (see full text of the decision); Landgericht Trier, Germany,
7 Dec. 2000, available at http://cisgw3.law.paceedu/cases/001207gl.html; CLOUT Case No. 320
[Audencia Provincial de Barcelona, Spain, 7 June 1999], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/990607s4.html (see full text of the decision); CLOUT Case No. 274 [Oberlandesgericht Celle,
Germany, 11 Nov. 1998], available athttp://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981 111 g l.html; CLOUT Case No.
223 [Cour d'appel Paris, France, 15 Oct. 1997], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
971015fl.html (see full text of the decision); CLOUT Case No. 287 [Oberlandesgericht Miinchen,
Germany, 9 July 1997], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970709s2.html; CLOUT Case No.
284 [Oberlandesgericht K6ln, Germany, 21 Aug. 1997], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
970821g1.html (see full text of the decision); CLOUT Case No. 162 [Ostre Landsret, Denmark, 22 Jan.
1996], available athttp://cisgw3.aw.pace.edu/cases/960122d 1.html; CLOUT Case No. 205 [Cour d'appel
Grenoble, France, 23 Oct. 1996],availableathttp:l/cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/961023fl.html;Landgericht
Siegen, Germany, 5 Dec. 1995, available athttp://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951205g1 .html; Gerechtshof
Is-Hertogenbosch, the Netherlands, 9 Oct. 1995, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
951009n .html; OberlandesgerichtMiinchen, Germany, 28 June 1995, available athttp://cisgw3.law.pace
.edu/cases/950628gl.html; CLOUT Case No. 153 [Cour d'appel Grenoble, France, 29 Mar. 1995],
available at http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/950329fl.html (see full text of the decision); Rechtbank
Middelburg, the Netherlands, 25 Jan. 1995, availableathttp://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950125n I.html;
Hof 's-Hertogenbosch, the Netherlands, 26 Oct. 1994, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
941026nl.html; CLOUT Case No. 156 [Cour d'appel Paris, France, 10 Nov. 1993], available athttp://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/93 11 10fl.html (see full text of the decision); CLOUT Case No. 25 [Cour
d'appel Grenoble, France, 16 June 1993], available athttp://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930616f1 .html.
19. For cases applying Article 31 to determine jurisdiction for purposes of Article5( 1) ofthe Lugano
Convention, see, for example, the following cases listed in the UNCITRAL Digest: Tribunal di Reggio
Emilia, Italy, 3 July 2000, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000703i3.html; Oberster
Gerichtshot Austria, 10 Sept. 1998, supra note 18.
For cases applying Article 57 to determine jurisdiction for purposes of Article 5(1) of the Lugano
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The metamorphosis of the Brussels Convention into the Brussels I
Regulation, which became effective on March 1, 2002, brought with it
concern about problems with Article 5(1) in determining the place of
performance of the "obligation in question."' Thus, in the Regulation this
provision was changed to read as follows:
A person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, be sued:
1. (a)
in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance
of the obligation in question;
(b)
for the purpose of this provision and unless otherwise agreed, the place of
performance of the obligation in question shall be:
- in the case of the sale ofgoods, the place in a Member State where, under
the contract, the goods were delivered or should have been delivered,
- in the case of the provision of services, the place in a Member State
where, under the contract, the services were provided or should have been
provided,
(c)
if subparagraph (b)does not apply then subparagraph (a) applies; ....

While CISG Article 57 generated a significant number of cases dealing with
jurisdiction under Article 5(1) of each of the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions,2 2 the new language of Article 5(l)(b) of the Brussels I

Regulation means that the place of performance of the buyer's payment
obligation has little or no relevance for determining jurisdiction within the

Convention, see, for example, the followingcases listed in the UNCITRAL Digest: Handelsgericht Aargau,
Switzerland, 5 Nov. 2002, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021105s l.html; Landgericht
Freiburg, Germany, 26 Apr. 2002, availableathttp://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020426gl .htmi; CLOUT
Case No. 221 [Zivilgericht des Kantons Basel-Stadt, Switzerland, 3 Dec 1997], available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/971203s2.html; CLOUT Case No. 194 [Bundesgericht, Switzerland, 18 Jan.
1996], availableat http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/9601 18sl.html.
20. Brussels I Regulation, supra note 12.
21. See, e.g., CHESHIRE & NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 204-08 (Peter North &
J.J. Fawcett eds., 13th ed. 1999); Joaquim-J Fomer, SpecialJurisdictionin CommercialContracts: From
the 1968 Brussels Convention to "Brussels-One Regulation," 13 INT'L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 131,
134 (2002):
To rely on the law applicable to the contract after the conflict of laws rule in order to establish
judicial jurisdiction is quite a complicated solution, but no other alternative seemed to clearly
improve the ECJ system. The amendments brought to the original BC68 by the four Treaties of
Adhesion in more than 20 years had not dared to deviate from the ECJ doctrine and the ECJ itself
has not found a good reason to do so. Moreover, the differences among the conflict of laws rules
on contracts of Member States have dramatically been reduced by virtue of the Rome Convention
on the law applicable to contractual obligations of June 19, 1980. Therefore, the place of
performance has to be found by the European national courts according to the same conflict of laws
rules.
See also id. at 134 nn. 32-33 and accompanying text.
22. See supra notes 18-19.
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Brussels system. Even if the case is brought on the payment obligation, the
jurisdictional inquiry will focus on the seller's obligation to deliver the goods.
This does not, however, eliminate the relevance of Article 3 1 forjurisdictional
purposes. If the contract specifically provides a place of performance of the
seller's obligation, that will determine the locus of jurisdiction under
Brussels I Regulation Article 5(1)(b), consistent with the chapeau of CISG
Article 3 1. If the contract does not provide for the place of delivery and the
CISG is the applicable substantive law, then Article 3 l(a), (b), and (c) will
provide the relevant rules for determining place of performance, even when
the claim is based on the buyer's payment obligation. Thus the Brussels I
Regulation amends the result in Tessili,2 3 moving a step closer to an
independent rule for determining place of performance of the obligation in
question. It does so, however, through a singular focus on the seller's
obligation to deliver the goods in a sales transaction, thereby retaining need
for reference to Article 31 when the Convention is the applicable substantive
law.
Several cases have faced the question of whether Article 31 continues to
serve as an aid in determining the place of performance for purposes of Article
5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation. One such case is Aquafli Textile Yarns
s.p.a. v. Updeals Ltd. in the Tribunale di Rovereto, Italy.24 According to the
UNILEX abstract of the case:
[T]he Court did [not] follow the seller's contention that the notion of "delivery" set out
in Art. 5(l)(b) of the European Regulation should have been interpreted in accordance
with CISG--to be considered as applicable to the merits of the dispute-and in particular
with its Art. 31 (a). It is true that under Art. 31 (a) CISG, if the contract involves carriage
of goods and there is no contrary agreement of the parties, the place for delivery is the
place where the goods have been handed over to the first carrier for transmission to the
buyer (in the case at hand, Italy). Since, however, by virtue of its own nature the EU
Regulation prevails over both domestic and international law, CISG cannot be used as
a means for interpreting it and therefore, the concept of "delivery" contained in the EU
Regulation has to be interpreted autonomously. 5

This is consistent with the language of the abstract of the same case found on
the Pace University Law School website:

23. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
24. Aquafili Textile Yarns s.p.a. v. Updeals Ltd., Tribunale di Rovereto, Italy, 28 Aug 2004,
availableat http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040828i3.html.
=
25. Unilex Abstract of id., availableathttp://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2376&dsmid
13353&x=1.
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Given that a question of interpretation could not be submitted to the European Court of
Justice by a trial court, it was the present court, therefore, that had to decide whether the
Regulation intended to use the term "delivery" as it is ordinarily used or whether the
meaning of the term should be determined pursuant to domestic law or the CISG. Noting
that (1) a substantive law convention may not be used to interpret a procedural law
convention, (2) there is not a substantive definition for the term "delivery of goods in a
sale of goods", and (3) premise number I1 to the Regulation expressly provides for the
domicile of a legal person to be defined autonomously so "as to make the common rules
more transparent and avoid conflicts of jurisdiction", the court held that the term
delivery, for the purpose of determining whether it was jurisdictionally competent, is the
place where the goods become available to the buyer, which usually is the place where
the defendant has its domicile. Finally, noting that the place of delivery for purposes of
the Regulation may differ from the place of delivery for purposes of substantive law, the
court nonetheless refused to pass judgment on it as it considered the matter committed
to the European Legislator and not subject to judicial review. 6

This result seems inconsistent with the language of the new Article 5(l)(b) of
the Brussels I Regulation. That provision continuesto require reference to
"the place in a Member State where, under the contract, the goods were
delivered or should have been delivered." If the contract explicitly provides
for a place of delivery, that of course will govern both CISG Article 31 and
Brussels Article 5(1). But the Aquafili conclusion that provisions of a
substantive law convention may not be used to interpret a procedural law
convention flies in the face of every decision that has used the rules of
Articles 31 and 57 to interpret Article 5(1) of the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions," and runs contrary to the European Court of Justice decision in
the Tessili case.2" A change of language from "the place ofperformance of the
obligation in question" in the Brussels Convention, to "the place in a Member
State where, under the contract, the goods were delivered or should have been
delivered" in the Brussels I Regulation, does not so easily implicate a change
from reliance on rules of applicable law to an independent rule on place of
performance. Thus, the Aquafili case seems clearly out of line with the rather
vast body of authority on the matter. It also is inconsistent with two other
recent cases applying Article 31 in light of the Brussels I Regulation,29
although a recent decision of the Austrian Supreme Court seems to agree with
the Aquafih analysis.3 °

26. Francesco Mazzotta, Abstract ofAquafli, supra note 24.
27. Seesupra notes 18-19.
28. See supra note 15.
29. Oberlandesgricht Wien,Austria, I June 2004 (CISG-online Case 1010), available at http://
www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test1 010; Gerechtshof Hertogenbosch, the Netherlands, 12 May
2004, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu.cases/040512n 1.html.
30. Oberster Gerichtshot Austria, 14 Dec. 2004, availableat http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
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One commentator argues that the Brussels I change to Article 5(1)(b)
means that Article 31 will "lose much of its relevance,"' but this begs the
question. Where is the place "where the goods were or should have been
delivered" under the contract? If the contract does not provide otherwise but
is governed by the CISG, and thus CISG Article 31 applies to substantive
determination of the place of performance of the seller's delivery obligation,
the connection between CISG Article 31 and Article 5(1) of the Brussels I
Regulation should be no different than it was with the same provision of the
Brussels Convention.
IV.

ARTICLE

31

OUTSIDE THE BRUSSELS REALM

All of the cases to date dealing with Article 31 and jurisdiction have been
from courts applying the Brussels Convention, the Lugano Convention, or the
Brussels I Regulation.32 This raises the question whether Article 31 has any
impact on jurisdictional issues in courts not applying one of these European
instruments: why has the same question not been raised outside of Europe in
the application of the CISG? If Article 31 has no jurisdictional impact in
other legal systems, then questions are raised about uniformity of application
and the effect of the CISG on a global basis.

041214a3.html ("IF]or reasons of the place of performance pursuant to Art. 5(l) [of the Brussels
Regulation], the lex causa is not decisive. The place of performance needs to be determined autonomously
by means of actual criteria.") (translation by Daniel Fritz).
31. See Ulrich G. Schroeter, Vienna Sales Convention: Applicability to "Mired Contracts" and
Interaction with the 1968 Brussels Convention, 5 VINDOBONA J. INT'L COM. L. & ARB. 74, 84 (2001):
The only novelty is the introduction of Article 5 No. 1(b) of the Brussels Regulation: in its first
indent, this provision fixes the place of performance for all obligations arising out of a contract of
sale-buyer's and seller's obligations alike-at the place where the goods were or should have been
delivered, thus avoiding any reliance on the Vienna Sales Convention for the determination of the
place of performance by fixing the place itself. This means that the frequently criticised interaction
of Article 57(l)(a) CISG with Article 5 No. I will, under the new provision, lose much of its
relevance, as will the effect of its counterpart, Article 31 CISG.
32. One Italian case technically applied the 1995 Italian Act on Private International Law to
jurisdiction over a defendant from Malaysia, but it was the Brussels Convention rule under Article 5(l) that
had been incorporated into that law that was applied. CLOUT Case No. 448 [Premier Steel Service Sdn.
Bhd v. Oscam S.p.A, Suprema Corte di Cassizione, Italy, 19 June 2000], available at http://cisgw3law
.pace.edu/cases/000619i3.html.
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A. ComparativeFoundations: U.S. Jurisdictionin Commercial Cases3
The United States furnishes an opportunity to consider the application of
CISG Article 31 in a system in which jurisdictional issues are governed by
rules different from those in the European system. In the United States,
jurisdictional concepts are divided into categories for several purposes.
Subject matter jurisdiction determines which court is appropriate for hearing
a specific type of case. Most state trial courts are courts of general subject
matter jurisdiction, and thus can hear any case. Federal courts, on the other
hand, are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction. Article III, Section 2
of the United States Constitution lists those areas in which federal subjectmatter jurisdiction may be asserted. 4 For the most part, federal statutes
further delineate the various bases of federal subject matter jurisdiction.35
The type ofjurisdiction dealt with in the European instruments discussed
above (the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, and the Brussels I Regulation)
is known as personal jurisdiction in the United States. Both subject matter
and personal jurisdiction must exist in order for a case to proceed. Personal
jurisdiction in the United States usually is described by asking whether the
court has jurisdiction "over the person" in question-sometimes discussed as
a "power based" approach to jurisdiction.36 Since consent is a fundamental
basis of jurisdiction, and a plaintiff is always deemed to have consented to
jurisdiction, the personal jurisdiction issue is relevant to the relationship
between the court and the defendant.
Analysis of personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts generally involves a twostep process. The first step is the application of the state "long-arm" statute
to determine ifthere is necessary statutory jurisdiction.3 7 These statutes differ,

33. Portions of this section are taken from Ronald A. Brand, Due Process,Jurisdiction anda Hague
Judgments Convention, 60 U. PITT. L. REv. 661 (1999).
§ 2.
34. U.S. CONST. art. llI,
35. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1367 (2000). See also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE
9-21 (4th ed. 2005).
36. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 35, at 100; Kevin Clermont, The Role of Private
InternationalLaw in the United States: Beating the Not-Quite-DeadHorse of Jurisdiction, in 2 CILE
STUDIES, PRIVATE LAW, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, & JUDICIAL COOPERATION IN THE EU-US
RELATIONSHIP

75, 91-94 (Ronald A. Brand ed., 2005).

37. Federal Courts genemlly are required to apply the state statute for the state in which they are
located. Jurisdiction in the federal courts is governed by Rule 4(k) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
This Rule provides three principal jurisdictional authorizations:
(1) Rule 4(k)(1)(A) authorizes a district court to borrow the jurisdictional powers of state courts in
the state where it is located;
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but generally can be categorized as list-type provisions, providing specific
bases of jurisdiction,3 8 and the constitutional limits statutes, providing that a
(2) Rule 4(k)(l)(D) confirms the availability of any applicable federal statute granting personal
jurisdiction; and
(3) Rule 4(k)(2) grants district courts personal jurisdiction to the limits of the [Fifth Amendment]
due process clause in certain federal question cases.
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 172 (3d ed. 1996). This most often
results in the federal court "borrowing" the state statute under Rule 4(k)(l)(A). Id. at 172-97.
38. New York and Pennsylvania both have such statutes. The New York statute provides in part:
Personal Jurisdiction by Acts of Non-domiciliaries
(a) Acts which are the basis ofjurisdiction. As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts
enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary, or
his executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent:
(1) transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services
in the state.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKinney 1990). Section 302 is limited to what has become referred to as "specific
jurisdiction" ("transacting business" in New York terminology) in which the cause of action must "arise
out of' the defendant's connection with the state. Section 301 of the N.Y. C.P.L.R. incorporates "general
jurisdiction" ("doing business" in New York terminology) by authorizing a court to "exercise such
jurisdiction over persons, property, or status as might have been exercised" before the enactment of the
C.P.LR. Id. at § 301. Thus, if the cause of action does not arise out of a transaction of business in New
York, "jurisdiction may be acquired only if the foreign corporation is doing business in the traditional
sense, Le., it must do business 'not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and
continuity."' Practice Commentary to N.Y. C.P.LR. § 301, at 9 (quoting Tauza Susquehanna Coal Co.,
220 N.Y. 259, 267 (1917)).
Pennsylvania's long-arm statute initially limits jurisdiction to actions arising out of the jurisdictional
nexus, but then adds a constitutional limits provision:
§ 5322. Bases of personal jurisdiction over persons outside this Commonwealth
(a) GENERAL RULE-A tribunal of this Commonwealth may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a person (or the personal representative of a deceased individual who would be subject to
jurisdiction under this subsection if not deceased) who acts directlyor by an agent, as to a cause of
action or other matter arising from such person:
(1) Transacting any business in this Commonwealth. Without excluding other acts which
may constitute transacting business in this Commonwealth, any of the following shall constitute
transacting business for the purpose of this paragraph:
(i) The doing by any person in this Commonwealth of a series of similar acts for the
purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object.
(ii) The doing of a single act in this Commonwealth for the purpose of thereby realizing
pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object with the intention of initiating a
series of such acts.
(iii) The shipping of merchandise directly or indirectly into or through this
Commonwealth.
(iv) The engaging in any business or profession within this Commonwealth, whether
or not such business requires license or approval by any government unit of this
Commonwealth.
(v) The ownership, use or possession of any real property situate within this
Commonwealth.
(2) Contracting to supply services or things in this Commonwealth....
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court in the state can exercise in personam jurisdiction to the limits of the Due
Process Clause. 9 The process of applying a list-type long-arm statute is not
unlike the application of the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels Convention
and Regulation. °
The second step in the United States is the constitutional analysis by
which it is determined whether the exercise of jurisdiction allowed by state
statute in the particular case is within the limits of the Due Process Clauses.
Because it usually is a state long-arm statute that is being considered,4 ' it is the
Fourteenth Amendment with which courts are most often concerned.
In the 1877 case of Pennoyer v. Neff,4 the U.S. Supreme Court adopted
a territorial approach to jurisdiction in its application of the Due Process
Clause, stating that "[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted
by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established."' 3 The Court
held that an Oregon court rendering ajudgment against a California defendant
was without jurisdiction over that defendant, and that the resulting judgment
44
was therefore invalid.
Like Article 2 ofthe Brussels I Regulation,4 5 U.S. jurisdictional principles
begin with the idea that a defendant is always subject to personal jurisdiction
in the courts where that defendant is located, no matter where the claim might
arise. 4' The difference is that in the United States it is recognized that a
defendant, particularly a corporate defendant, maybe located forjurisdictional
purposes in more than one territorial space. Thus, U.S. concepts of general
jurisdiction are not limited to formal definitions of domicile.47 A defendant

(b) EXERCISE OF FULL CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OVER NONRESIDENTS.-In
addition to the provisions of subsection (a) the jurisdiction of the tribunals of this Commonwealth
shall extend to all persons who are not within the scope of section 5301 (relating to persons) to the
fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States and may be based on the most
minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322 (West 1997).
39. California has such a statute: "A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not
inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." CAL. CiV. PROc. CODE § 410.10
(West 1973). Paragraph (b) of the Pennsylvania Statute, supra note 38, adds this type of provision to the
list-type format.
40. See, e.g., Brussels Convention, supra note 10, arts. 5 el seq.
41. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
42. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
43. Id. at 720.
44. Id. at 734.
45. See supranote 12.
46. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.457,462 (1940) ("[d]omicile in thestate is alone sufficient tobring
an absent defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment").
47. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
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is found for jurisdictional purposes wherever it is doing business in a
continuous and systematic manner, and thus wherever it is purposefully
availing itself of the benefits of the local economy and legal system. It may
be brought before a court in such ajurisdiction for claims arising anywhere.48
If the defendant's activity in the forum state is not continuous and
systematic, however, then the concept of specific jurisdiction applies, and suit
may be brought only on claims arising out of the activity of the defendant
within the forum state. In other words, if the activity of the defendant in the
forum state is significant enough, general jurisdiction exists based solely on
the connection between the defendant and the forum state; and if the activity
is below this threshold, then jurisdiction may exist, but it is then "specific"
jurisdiction based on a combination of the connections among the defendant,
the forum state, and the claim.49 Even then, however, "a state court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as
there exist 'minimum contacts' between the defendant and the forum State," 0
Meyer, supra note 46): "[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to ajudgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."
48. InternationalShoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317:
"Presence" in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the activities of the
corporation there have not onlybeen continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities
sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of process
has been given.... Conversely it has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the
corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the
corporation's behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the
activities there.
49. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) ("When a
controversy is related to or 'arises out of' a defendant's contacts with the forum, the Court has said that a
'relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation' is the essential foundation of in personam
jurisdiction."). The distinction between general and specific jurisdiction was first suggested in Arthur T.
von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman,Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1121, 1144-64 (1966).
50. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,291 (1980).
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable,
functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient
forum. And it acts to ensure that the States through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits
imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.
Id. at 292.
When a corporation "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State,"..., it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk
of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if
the risks are too great, severing its connection with the State.... The forum State does not exceed
its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that
delivers its products into the stream of commeree with the expectation that they will be purchased
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and when "[t]he relationship between the defendant and the forum [is] such
that it is 'reasonable ... to 1require the corporation to defend the particular suit
which is brought there.9"5
One can summarize the comparison between European and U. S. concepts
jurisdiction by beginning with the concept of general jurisdiction.
personal
of
Here the two systems begin with the similar rule that jurisdiction exists in the
courts of the state of the defendant's domicile, for claims arising anywhere.
In the United States, this concept extends beyond just the state of the
defendant's domicile to wherever the defendant has acted within the forum
state in a continuous and systematic manner. Similarly, both systems
acknowledge that it is appropriate to allow jurisdiction in a place other than
where the defendant is so long as there exists a proper nexus with the forum
state. The difference is that this nexus in the European system is nearly
always described as being between the claim and the forum state. Thus, in
Brussels Regulation Article 5(1) terms, jurisdiction exists at the place of
performance of the obligation in question under the contract-focusing on the
relationship between the contract and the forum state. In the United States, a
nexus is required among the forum state, the claim, and the defendant, with
the important factor for Due Process purposes being the relationship between
the defendant and the forum state. When that relationship is not continuous
and systematic,jurisdiction may still exist if there is also a relationship to the
claim based upon the defendant's contacts with the forum state. Finally, both
systems rely on similar codified language, found now in Europe in a
Community Regulation and in the United States in the relevant state long-arm
statutes. While in Europe the analysis begins and ends with this codification,
in the United States there is a necessary constitutional limitation that must
additionally be met.
B. CISG Article 31 and U.S. JurisdictionalRules
Looking at U.S. jurisdictional rules in conjunction with CISG Article 31,
one finds that-unlike the situation in Europe-the place of performance of
the seller's obligation to deliver the goods is not determinative ofjurisdiction
for a plaintiff wanting to bring suit outside the state of the defendant's
domicile. In ascertaining whether specific jurisdiction exists, it may be one

by consumers in the forum State.
Id. at 297-98.
51. Id. at 292 (quoting from InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 317).
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factor in a court's analysis of the contacts between the defendant, the claim,
and the forum state. In fact, it may serve as the starting point under the
relevant state long-arm statute. For example, under the Pennsylvania statute,
personal jurisdiction exists over a person: "as to a cause of action or other
matter arising from such person: ....(2) Contracting to supply services or
things in this Commonwealth."5 2 Similarly, in New York: "a court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or
administrator, who in person or through an agent: 1. transacts any business
within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the
state. ...

Thus, statutory personal jurisdiction may exist based on the place of
delivery of the goods. Like the European Court of Justice interpretation of
Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention,5 4 neither of these statutes provides an
independent definition of the term "contracting to supply goods in the state."
Thus it is necessary to look to applicable substantive law to determine when
such an event occurs. If that law is the CISG, then Article 31 would be the
source of the substantive law rule. And if the Article 31 rule results in the
place of delivery being within the forum state, then statutory jurisdiction
would exist. But the jurisdictional inquiry in the United States does not end
at this point. It is then necessary to apply the due process limitations, and to
determine (1) whether the defendant has engaged in activity in or directed at
the forum state (the "minimum contacts" analysis), and (2) whether that
activity results in such a relationship between the defendant and the forum as
to make it reasonable to require the defendant to defend the particular suit."
C. The Implications ofDiffering JurisdictionalRules for the Application of
CISG Article 31
The implications of Article 31 in systems applying differing jurisdictional
rules is perhaps most easily understood by considering some of the possible
circumstances in which it might be applied. For the situations discussed
below, assume that the CISG is the applicable substantive law for each
transaction in question.
Variation 1: Assume that:
(1) the contract of sale is between a French seller and a German buyer;

52.
53.
54.
55.

42 PA.

CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322(a)(2), supra note 38.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a), supra note 38.
See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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(2) no specific designation of the place of delivery of the goods is stated
in the contract;
(3) the contract contains no use of a price-delivery term; and
(4) the contract involves carriage of the goods.
A dispute arises, and the German buyer brings suit in a German court.
The Brussels I Regulation provides the applicable jurisdictional rules,
since both France and Germany are Member States of the European Union.
The court in which the action is brought is not in the state of the defendant's
domicile, so general jurisdiction does not exist under Article 2 of the
Brussels I Regulation. The overwhelming body ofcase law would compel that
we look to CISG Article 31 (a) to determine the place of performance of the
seller's obligation to deliver the goods. Since the seller would hand the goods
over to the first carrier in France, the seller's delivery obligation is situated in
France. Thus, jurisdiction under both Article 2 and Article 5(l)(b) of the
Brussels I Regulation lies in France. The German court has no jurisdiction
under the Brussels I Regulation.
Variation 2: Assume the same facts as Variation 1, except that when the
dispute arises, the French seller brings suit in a French court.
Once again, the overwhelming body of case law would compel that we
look to CISG Article 31(a) to determine the place of performance of the
seller's obligation to deliver the goods. Again, the court in which the action
is brought is not in the state of the defendant's domicile, so general
jurisdiction does not exist under Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation. While
CISG Article 57(1) deals with the location of the buyer's obligation to pay the
price, that issue is no longer relevant under Article 5(1)(b) of the Brussels I
Regulation for purposes ofjurisdiction. Article 5(l)(b) continues to require,
however, that we determine under the contract the place at which "the goods
were delivered or should have been delivered," and now provides for
jurisdiction in this location even for an action on the buyer's obligation to pay
the purchase price. Since this location is determined for substantive law
purposes by Article 31(a) CISG, jurisdiction under Article 5(1)(b) of the
Brussels I Regulation lies where the goods are handed over to the first carrier,
and that is in France. The French court thus has jurisdiction, even though the
defendant is domiciled in Germany.
Variation 3: Assume that the contract is between a French seller and a
German buyer, and that the contract includes a DDP price-delivery term
(delivered duty paid) and expressly makes that term subject to the ICC
Incoterms 2000. In other words, the facts are the same as in Variations 1 and
2, except that a specific designation of the place of delivery of the goods (the
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buyer's place of business) is included. A dispute arises, and the German
buyer brings suit in a German court.
This time the case law would again lead us to CISG Article 3 1, but the
applicable provision would be the chapeau, since the existence of the pricedelivery term (as governed by the Incoterms) means that "the seller [is] bound
to deliver the goods at [a] particular place." That place is now in Germany,
and under Article 5(1)(b) of the Brussels I Regulation the German court has
jurisdiction over the case involving a French defendant.
These first three variations indicate that, so long as suit is brought in the
courts of a state other than the state of the defendant's domicile, the place of
delivery of the goods is determinative ofjurisdiction under Article 5(1)(b) of
the Brussels I Regulation, and CISG Article 31 provides the rule for
determining the place of the seller's obligation to deliver the goods. Thus,
consistent with the decision of the European Court of Justice in the Tessili
case,56 there is no independent rule defining the place of delivery of the goods
in the Brussels I Regulation, and when the applicable law is the CISG, Article
31 will provide the determinative definition for purposes of jurisdictional
analysis when the Brussels I Regulation applies.
Now consider the same type of case, but with one of the parties having its
place of business in a state outside of the European Union.
Variation 4: Assume that:
(1) the contract of sale is between a French seller and a New York buyer;
(2) no specific designation of the place of delivery of the goods is stated
in the contract;
(3) the contract contains no use of a price-delivery term; and
(4) the contract involves carriage of the goods.
A dispute arises, and the New York buyer brings suit in a New York court
(i.e., the same facts as Variation 1, but now with a New York buyer).
The jurisdictional analysis will begin with the New York long-arm
statute, whether the action is brought in state or federal court.57 Under section
301 of the New York Civil Practice Law & Rules, general jurisdiction will
exist over the French defendant if,under a due process analysis, that defendant
is engaged in continuous and systematic business activity in the State of New
York.5 8 Since that is unlikely in our hypothetical case, we must look to the
specific jurisdiction ("transacting business") rules of section 302 of the New

56.
57.
58.

See supra note 15.
See supra note 37.
See supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
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York Civil Practice Law & Rules, which provide that "a court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary... who in person or through an
agent: (1) transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to
supply goods or services in the state," for "a cause of action arising from...
the acts enumerated."59 The statute requires both that there be activity in, or
directed at, the state of New York, and that the cause of action arise out of that
activity. In our hypothetical case, this determination would require additional
factual analysis focused on the conduct of the defendant in negotiating and
carrying out the contract arrangements. Under CISG Article 3 1, the goods
were "delivered" by the seller when handed over to the first carrier in France,
so if the CISG substantive rule is determinative of the place at which the
goods were "supplied" for purposes of the New York statute, then no
jurisdiction would exist. Whatever the result of the application of the longarm statute, jurisdiction in New York is further limited by the Due Process
Clause, and will exist only if the French defendant had some "minimum
contacts" with (i.e., activity in or directed at) New York, and if it is reasonable
to hale the defendant into a New York court based on the existing facts.
Variation 5: Assume that:
(1) the contract of sale is between a New York seller and a French buyer;
(2) no specific designation of the place of delivery of the goods is stated
in the contract;
(3) the contract contains no use of a price-delivery term; and
(4) the contract involves carriage of the goods.
A dispute arises, and the New York seller brings suit in a New York court
(i.e., the U.S. equivalent of the facts of Variation 2, above).
Assuming once again that general jurisdiction does not exist as a result
of continuous and systematic activity of the French defendant in the state of
New York, these facts demonstrate perhaps the greatest difference between
European and U.S. jurisdictional concepts. Under CISG Article 3 1, the place
of performance of the Seller's delivery obligation is in New York, since that
is the place where the seller will hand the goods over to the first carrier. But,
unlike Article 5(1)(b) of the Brussels I Regulation, the New York statute does
not base jurisdiction over a claim brought against the buyer on the payment
obligation on the place of performance of the seller's obligation to deliver
goods. The French buyer has not contracted to "supply goods or services in
the state" of New York, so the specific transacting business rule of the longarm statute is not met, and there is no need to continue to the due process

59.

See supra note 38.
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analysis. Unlike the situation in Variation 2, above, jurisdiction would not
exist in the seller's court to sue on the buyer's payment obligation.'. Nor
would the provisions of CISG Article 31 be likely to have any impact on this
jurisdictional analysis.6
Variation 6: Assume that the contract is between a French seller and a
New York buyer, and the contract includes a DDP price-delivery term
(delivered duty paid) and expressly makes that term subject to the ICC
Incoterms 2000. A dispute arises, and the New York buyer brings suit in a
New York court (facts similar to those in Variation 3, above).
This time the New York long-arm statute would seem to apply. The
French seller has contracted to "supply goods or services in the state" of New
York. Under simple application of the DDP Incoterm, and by reference to the
chapeau of CISG Article 31, the place of the delivery obligation is in New
York. Unlike the analysis in Variation 3, however, this does not end the
jurisdictional analysis. We must address the due process limitation and
determine whether this is activity of the French defendant in or directed at the
state of New York and then whether it is reasonable on the facts to bring that
defendant into a New York court. If the contract was negotiated in France,
and no representative of the French defendant has ever been in New York, the
mere fact that the contract called for the delivery obligation to be satisfied in
New York, without more, is unlikely to result in a determination of
jurisdiction over the French defendant for due process purposes.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The vast majority of cases that have interpreted CISG Article 31 have
dealt with the effect of the four rules found in that article on the question of
whether the court seised has jurisdiction to hear the case. In each instance,
this resulted from the concurrent application of the CISG and one of the
European instruments dealing with jurisdiction over foreign defendants (the
Brussels and Lugano Conventions, and the Brussels I Regulation). In every

60. It is possible that specific jurisdiction could exist under a more expansive long-arm statute in
some U.S. states. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10, supra note 39 ("A court of this state may
exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States."). This would, however, require that the French buyer have specific contacts with the U.S. state not
found in our hypothetical, and would not involve the application of CISG Article 31.
61. Despite the apparently common belief that U.S. courts have a longer jurisdictional reach than
do courts in other countries, this is a situation in which jurisdiction under Article 5(1) of the Brussels I
Regulation clearly exteads farther than does jurisdiction in a U.S. court, and would thus be considered
exorbitant under U.S. due process standards.
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case but two, the court has made the CISG Article 31 rule determinative of the
application of the Article 5(1) rule of the applicable European instrument.
The two exceptions conflict with the Tessili decision of the European Court
of Justice and with every other court that has considered the same question
under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions.
Consideration of jurisdictional rules in the United States, and
consideration of a set of hypothetical variations comparing the application of
those rules with Article 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, indicate that, while
in some instances CISG Article 31 may have an impact on jurisdictional
analysis in the United States, it will seldom (if ever) be determinative, and at
times will have no impact on that analysis. This is rather different from its
role under the European instruments. The result is different effects of the
same provision, depending on the court (and legal system) in which the issue
is addressed. While this may not indicate different interpretation of the
substantive rule found in Article 3 1, it does indicate different interpretation
of the issue most often raised to date in the application of that substantive rule
in the courts of CISG Contracting States.
The fact that the substantive rules of the CISG may have an outcomedeterminative effect for jurisdictional purposes brings into play one more
indication of the "homeward trend" analysis.62 Professor Flechtner has
elsewhere noted the challenge to uniform interpretation of the CISG triggered
by different language versions of the text and by reservations made by the
Contracting States.6 3 He has also noted, that "[p]erhaps the single most
important source of non-uniformity in the CISG is the different background
assumptions and conceptions that those charged with interpreting and
applying the Convention bring to the task." 4 Article 31 poses one of those
many parts of the CISG where these "background assumptions and
conceptions" are not only a result of different legal training and thinking but
also a result of the interplay of the CISG with other laws and conventions that

62.

JOHN HONN OLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES

1 (1989):

The Convention, faute de mieux, will often be applied by tribunals (judges or arbitrators) who will
be intimately familiar only with their own domestic law. The tribunals, regardless of their merit,
will be subject to a natural tendency to read the international rules in light of the legal ideas that
have been imbedded at the core of their intellectual formation. The mind sees what the mind has
means of seeing.
63. Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the CISG in a DecentralizedSystem: Observations
on Translations,Reservationsand Other Challenges to the Uniformity Principlein Article 7(1), 17 J.L.
&CoM. 187 (1998).
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require reference to the CISG for final determination of the outcome of a case.
While this is a positive law bias, and not in any way a subjective bias, it
nonetheless can affect uniformity of results when resort to the CISG is
required.

